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With the integration of Accounting, Economics, Finance and Social Psychology, 
more and more foreigner researchers have begun to research the model of 
compensation contract and reconsider firms’ compensation strategy from fairness 
preference. However，The research in this area has been still at beginning stage in 
China. Therefore, based on the fairness theory and the relative deprivation theory 
which focus on the distributive justice preference, and the contract theory which 
focuses on the compensation contract design, the dissertation  discusses the 
following questions: On the premise that people are characterized with fairness 
preference，how the intra-firm compensation inequity and firm members’ fairness 
preference affect the firm performance? 
I design a CEO/ worker compensation contract model for a single agent and a top 
management team compensation contract model for multiple agents in the tournament 
mechanisms based on the firm members’ fairness preference. Several propositions are 
derived from the models and corresponding theories: the stronger the firm members’ 
fairness preference is, the lower the  firm performance; and the firm performance 
reacts in a reverse U-shaped way to compensation gap in the firm. These propositions 
form the theoretical foundations for the following empirical studies, which examines 
the relationship between intra-firm compensation inequity and firm performance, as 
well as firm members’ fairness preference and firm performance. The main 
innovations of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Inter-firm compensation gap comparison is augmented into the existing model, 
and two compensation contract models are designed with the firm members’ fairness 
preference.  From the two models, I derive the proposition of negative relationship 
between firm members’ fairness preference and firm’s performance, which is 
verification to prior literature, and the proposition of a reverse U-shaped relationship 
between the firms’ performance and intra-firm compensation gap, which gives a 
theoretical support to the prior empirical results. 













formula evidences that only the compensation gap irrelevant with the firm members’ 
input difference can stand for the compensation inequity. In order to improve the 
accuracy of compensation inequity computation, the factors reflecting firm members’ 
input difference, are augmented and supplemented into the empirical model. Using 
Chinese listed companies’ data, I also empirically test the positive correlation between 
firm performance and intra-firm compensation inequality in some certain extent.  
3. In order to resolve the difficulties in obtaining the data of firm members’ fairness 
preference, I measure firm members’ fairness preference from two dimensions: the 
nature of firm ultimate ownership and the location of the firm. Using Chinese listed 
companies’ data, I also empirically examine the fact that strong firm members’ 
fairness preference can mitigate performance motivating effect of the members’ 
compensation level and intra-firm compensation inequity.  
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酬契约现象(Baker et al., 1988)。 
从 20 世纪 90 年代起，社会心理学所研究的公平偏好问题开始被经济学界所
关注，一些关于公平偏好的经典模型相继被提出，比如研究分配结果公平的






































时，2008 年 6 月起北京、河南、上海等地相继公布当地工资指导线，并且涨幅
明显高于往年，人力资源和社会保障部有关部门开始着手起草《企业工资条例》。





















































                                                        



















































































图 1-1 研究技术路径图 
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